On the eve of the most ambitious enlargement in the history of our continent’s integration it will cause no surprise that that is what I chose to discuss. I will speak briefly of the successes, challenges and obstacles, of the road I think we should take and of our determination in doing so.

We are meeting on the eve of a decisive moment for the evolution of the European project – the accession of ten new countries to the Union. In a chronological curve shorter than a man’s life, the clear-sighted vision of Monnet and Schuman – and those who shared it during those difficult early times – has continued to advance the ways of peace, unity and development that many at the time considered no more than an inaccessible utopia.

With this step, a goal is accomplished and an ambition achieved. With it we readjust the face of Europe to bring it more in line with history and with the expectations of its peoples. With it, we also reaffirm a desire: to correct, through the sovereign decision of States, the fracture lines that the recent past drew on the political map of Europe.

Personally, as I have repeated with conviction, this enlargement represents a duty, acknowledges a necessity and provides an opportunity. A duty, because we must support the avowedly difficult initial path of the new democracies of central and eastern Europe, and the European option chosen by Malta and Cyprus; a necessity, because in the face of the current globalisation process, we need a Europe that is more united in its diversity, better to make its weight felt on the decisions taken on a worldwide scale; finally, an opportunity, because together in solidarity we will be able with increased effectiveness to protect the development and safety of the continent and international peace and stability.

We are living an historic moment for us all – rulers and citizens – which places upon us new demands and responsibilities. In the face of a world confronted with unheard-of challenges, the rearrangement of the European Union has an obvious political and geo-strategic value that will be projected beyond its borders. That is precisely why it implies a duty to achieve results corresponding to the expectations created, both within and outside it. The challenge is clear: the dimension of this present enlargement, the recent memory of the painful historic experiences lived by almost all the new States, the diversified weight of economic asymmetries in the new space, pose various problems for the European Union, not only within the framework of institutional effectiveness, but also on the plane of managing different political sensibilities, as well as in the field of defending its territory’s desirable socio-economic cohesion.

Never like today has the old argument between enlargement and deepening become so important for the future of the European project.

Before us are two paths: on the one hand pursuing the idea of integration on an – not always linear - path of progressive union between the States and their peoples; on the other, its dilution in an enormous free trade area, based on fragile disciplines, without the ties of political solidarity that have so far ensured the success of the most remarkable diplomatic construction of our times. That is why we must be aware that - whilst no doubt useful when projects were evolving - political voluntarism will be of little use if it is not based on clear objectives and sustained strategies.

In this context, the present complex world structure shows us the road to take. And this – I have no doubt – assuredly demands more Europe of us. More Europe, strictly respecting national identities and consensual sharing of sovereignties; more Europe in a close, trusting co-operation between Member States, based on the rule of law they freely established and marked by a positive approach to the principle of subsidiarity; more Europe, for efficient intervention on the world scene; more Europe, in consolidating the rights and duties that will give body to true European citizenship; more Europe, for all to achieve a better understanding of its cultural diversity; more Europe, in strengthening the policies of solidarity that will aid real convergence of its States thus leading to proper social and economic cohesion of the European space.

To achieve this, at a time when efforts – and hopes – are renewed of attaining the compromise that will make it possible to sign the Constitutional Treaty, it is important to defend principles - such as that of equality between Member States - which are vital for an increasingly closer union of the European peoples. I underline this point, because it is essential to ensure the store of balances and the political trust so painstakingly built up since the Treaty of Rome. I mention it because during the Convention and later, throughout the IGC, it was not always possible to avoid outbursts of unnecessarily highhanded attitudes, of worrying national egotisms, or superfluous manoeuvres to achieve a less than fair distribution of internal power within the Union.

And whilst I naturally understand the need not to let institutions be weakened by the sudden change in the number of Member States, nor to encourage obstacles to the decision-making process, I observed with some concern the temptation to establish hierarchies, or certain tendencies that may favour excessively intergovernmental courses.

As for the latter, the path so far followed by European construction shows a repeated oscillation between supra-nationality and intergovernmentality. The nature of this enlargement, however, and the problems that Europe must face in the troublesome world of our days, counsel us not to invert the line of progressive and prudent delegations of competences and to favour the gradual strengthening of the Community method. In this regard I believe that the words of Jacques Delors are still very pertinent, as he faced a similar issue during the negotiations of the Treaty of Maastricht : “there is no triumphant example of co-operation between nations that has endured on an intergovernmental basis. My fear – warned Delors – is that the intergovernmental method may pollute the Community method and in fact make it retreat”. I think that it is important to meditate on this warning, as the current international political scene has revived the risks of which Delors spoke and recent experiences reveal the imperious need to protect European cohesion and unity.

I have spoken to you of deepening and unity. Two words that should plot our course and serve to cement a political project that has been hit by recurrent pessimism and criticisms. Ever since the Treaty of Rome was signed, in fact, many voices have been raised to censure – often rightly so – the lack of ambition, or predict – with obvious political short-sightedness – the exhaustion of a model that has guaranteed peace and prosperity to a Europe previously torn asunder by hegemonic wars and rivalries. Happily, despite the turbulent sea of scepticisms and frustrations, we could borrow Fellini’s irony to affirm “e la nave va” and express our trust that, contrary to his ship, ours will be able to resist the ambushes and obstacles of the course. European construction has over the years been able to overcome obstacles, periods of inertia, internal and external upheavals, to fulfil objectives and schedules. First of all, and without going any further, by the physical installation of the single currency, an operation of remarkable political and technical success.

It was a moment of decisive federating impact and a spur to the integrationist project, as the spirit of a community of destinies - without which the ties binding its citizens would be less solid - travelled tangibly with the euro to the four corners of the Union.

I mention the introduction of the single currency, because it has clearly proved that the progress along the path of balanced integration is possible provided that certain essential factors are present: appropriate technical preparation (the works of the Delors Committee were vital to the success of the decision); leadership capacity (and it is only fair here to recall the actions of President Mitterand and Chancellor Kohl); and the mobilisation of an effective political will of the Member States to assume goals and ambitions.

Nevertheless the triumph obtained means that we must be aware of all that can be improved. Having mentioned an example of success, it would be worth remembering that many have pointed to the absence of efficient instruments of economic governance that, on a par with the monetary aspect and the fight for price stabilisation, will foresee difficulties and promote efforts for greater convergence of economic policies. This is a problem that we know garners no consensus, but which should urgently be discussed once the new Commission is in place. At the same time, the debate on the harsh rigidity of the Stability Pact, which has caused some disagreements between Member States and the Commission, equally requires a lucid, non-ideological approach, exploring solutions of compromise either for a new formulation of the Pact (an avowedly complex task) or, possibly more realistically, for a pragmatic agreement on a less blind and more intelligent application of the existing standards. Let us hope, however, that without prejudice to its essential objectives and disciplines, it will be possible to arrive at a consensus that avoids the current dogmatic mal-adjustment of some of its obligations to aspects of economic reality. In this area, the disinterested example of other countries, such as the US, with its capacity to react to crises or periods of recession, might serve as an example.

Personally, and because this is an issue that worries me, I remain true to what I suggested at the University Institute in Florence two years ago. At the time, well before the present debate, I advocated that whilst not setting aside the common commitment to budget discipline, we should be more flexible in applying the rules of the Pact, taking into account the different circumstances of each State.

This could be based on considering a budget balance that assessed the quality of the expense, and thus excluded the sums needed to pursue public investment policies from the deficit constraints and their perverse effects on the essential economic upturn. This is weighty political material, as we are moving towards a dangerous situation - both regarding the necessary credibility of the Pact, and the negative trend for it to become a factor of antagonism between national and Community authorities, thus damaging the desirable deepening of European construction.

Now, if the process leading to the single currency was a remarkable victory for the federative project, we might say that with it the persistent difference between the solidity of the Union’s economic pillar and the fragilities of its political aspect has become more marked.

As for the former, we see structured disciplines, fulfilled schedules, clear policies and objectives; as regards the latter, however, we are aware of wavering steps, frequent obstacles, and obvious difficulties in defining and executing common strategies.

One might say that this is only natural, as this is a field in which the classic instruments of sovereignty are affirmed, and which affects the sensitive nerves of national organisations, both in foreign affairs, defence, and in the judiciary. Too easily we became used to commentators and citizens describing Europe pejoratively as a persistent political dwarf in direct opposition to its economic power. The deepening of the Union should also mean this – linking ambition and realism.

It will not be easy, as the weight of tradition and facts is undeniable: despite being the main world donor of aid to development, the European Union has not been able to correct its weak capacities in foreign affairs. The reasons are well known because, as we have already said, this is the meeting ground for constraints derived from the affirmation of sovereignties and rivalries, the desire for national protagonism, and historic relationships and areas of diplomatic influence. Despite the progress made, thanks to the Single Act and the Treaty of Maastricht, we continue to witness the obvious deficit of the Union’s credibility in its approach to major international issues, where it is often absent, no more than declaratory or, worse, paid no heed to.

With this picture in mind, I side with those who believe that it is urgent for Europe to acquire consistent strategic thinking, convincing, scheduled objectives and instruments to enable credible intervention. This is the only way for it to gain the stature to which it should aspire, of a global political actor, becoming a structuring pole of international, not merely regional, peace and stability. Only then will it be able suitably to defend its specific interests, make its position heard, and protect its own values. In this field, the path pursued by the Convention and by the IGC, considered frustrating by some and excessive by others, has left signs of positive developments, such as a more effective foreign policy of the Union, supported by instruments of flexibility in the decision-making area and by a defence capability to increase its credibility and consistent intervention. Along the same lines we could register – particularly due to their political significance – various decisions of the last European Councils, such as the adoption of a European security strategy document, the development of military capabilities, namely in the field of planning and defining global strategic objectives, the creation of the European Armament Agency, the establishment of an External Borders Administration Agency, and recently, given the terrorist threat, several measures of solidarity and closer co-operation to increase the security of Member States.

This is a field of intervention that requires a fine balance between real decision-making capacity and political credibility. For this it is important to create conditions to achieve a broad degree of partners’ involvement, which is only possible through open, non-exclusivist, participation models; but for that we must also defend a necessary image of cohesion in Europe, which is not compatible with avant-garde temptations outside the institutional framework of the Treaty.

In this regard it must be made clear that the strengthening required for the current Common Foreign Security and Defence Program, namely the creation of a proper autonomous defence capability, does not involve any intention of power rivalry with the US, which not even a simple awareness of the realities would allow. I count myself among those who believe that the quarrel between the pro-Atlantic faction and the pro-Europe faction is useless, occurring as it does out of time and lacking substance. It is not a question of cutting through a dilemma or opting between two alternatives. The current situation in the world shows that we need each other on both sides of the Atlantic. It is, based on that reality that I believe we must forge a more cohesive and stronger European Union in the field of security so that, in close and loyal understanding with the US, we can contribute efficiently to sustained human progress. This, in the certainty that the differences that will perforce emerge will not affect the heritage of common values on which the transatlantic relationship has always been based.

This deepening I have been talking to you about also requires strong social and economic cohesion of the European territory and the Union’s appropriate competitive capacity in a world where the information economy models progress and establishes dominations.

Europe has been, particularly after the approval of the first Delors Package, a space of solidarity. Since then, increasing resources have - with clear-sighted vision - been mobilised and shared, leading to policies promoting convergences and modernity. With these, with overall success, we have sought to embody the effort of social, economic and territorial cohesion that the Treaty of Maastricht defined as a Community priority, the more so as, in the words of its text, “it contributes to the economic growth of all States”. That is why I find it difficult to understand that within the perspective of an enlarged Europe, where inequalities and disparities will be much greater than they are now, some continue significantly to restrict the threshold of expenses foreseen in the next Union budget. I believe that it is important to avoid that double risk, either of defrauding the expectations of support for the States now joining or cutting short or slowing down, because of statistical criteria, essential development programmes.

On the other hand, as an unprecedented multilateral experience, European construction can help to establish legitimate disciplines to guide the process of globalisation. First of all, on the social plane. I am one of those who believe that the European social model is behind decades of economic growth and social progress of the countries of the continent. To do this it was necessary to make a continued effort to limit and correct the inequalities caused by the free play of economic relations. Here, too, economic cohesion is at stake as we live in times where there are increasing signs of a crisis in the system of employment, within the framework of industrial relations, and in the very models of social protection.

And because by its very dimension the task is beyond the individual capacity of States, at the level of the Union (unfortunately, the draft Treaty is again very reticent in this regard) we must consider methods and instruments that foster conditions of full employment and facilitate ways to adapt the systems of industrial relations to the economic mutations and challenges of globalisation.

I remind you that in order to face up to some of these concerns the Union launched the so-called Lisbon Strategy, mobilising governments and institutions for an effort marked by open co-operation and co-ordination targets, with a view to placing technological innovation and the definition of a social policy in a position of priority in Community actions. In Lisbon, 2010 was fixed as the date when the Union should become the world’s most competitive information economy.

Now, as acknowledged by the last European Council, fulfilling this calendar is already delayed, although the Council did reaffirm its political will and defined new guidelines, namely to favour sustained growth and a high level of social cohesion. This is a good thing, as only then will Europe correct fragilities that damage its position in a rapidly changing world.

Because I believe it is useful, I will end by recalling the accession experience of my country. Portugal’s accession in 1986, following the end of the oldest colonial empire in Europe, represented a political option based on an unusual degree of consensus. Integration within the European framework (someone called it the return of the caravels) opened a new era for Portugal: ending a period of international isolation contrary to the country’s extremely old historic tradition, bringing political peace and prosperity; forging a new mentality in the people, favouring a different dynamic with European partners, ensuring the consolidation of democracy and the strict functioning of the rule of law, facilitating paths to modernisation and prosperity, as well as extending the national framework of external intervention.

I believe that at a time when we are celebrating the arrival of ten new partners it was fitting to testify to our trust in the path that has guided our collective adventure, while safeguarding Europe from its old demons. The present enlargement, after all, is based on the conviction that it is no longer possible for States, however powerful, to provide on their own efficient answers to the diversified and complex problems of the today’s world. The current fight against global terrorism, whose barbaric irrationality has indiscriminately attacked the foundations of our daily life, is the most telling illustration that all free women and men of our times are involved in a battle that was imposed on us, and which we can only win together.

As with all great strategic options, European construction also requires the conscious participation of its citizens. To do that it is important to embark on a task of clarification, debate and discussion of the major European themes, to make more solid and more participated the community of destiny that we already are, and to enlarge the community of feeling that binds us together