Conferência do Presidente da República na Universidade de Atenas - "Notas sobre o Debate Constitucional Europeu" - (versão em inglês)

Atenas
03 de Dezembro de 2002


Vice-Chancellor,
Ministers,
Professors,
Ambassadors,
Dear Students,

My first words must go to thank Athens University, in the person of its Vice-Chancellor, Professor George Babiniotis, for the kind invitation to address this prestigious institution. I would also like to thank you, Vice-Chancellor, for the words you have just spoken which greatly touched me and honour the country I represent.

To talk about Europe in your beautiful country which, for the world, is still the everlasting symbol of and European civilization and culture is a task that I approach with emotion, respect and, I must confess, a sense of humbleness.

At this crucial moment of European construction when our common destiny is being defined, I believe it is timely to revisit the places of our origins. An enlightened knowledge of the past always helps us exorcize unfounded fears and invalidate fallacious arguments that restrict people’s freedom and mortgage their future; it also helps to shed light on some of the questions and doubts that always arise in periods of great transformations and change such as we are now experiencing.

I therefore believe a short digression through our collective history that grew precisely in this geographical area will help us to frame the current debate about the future of Europe.

In the first place, because it was the Greek world that witnessed the birth of the so-called "European civilization" on which Europe’s unity is based. Secondly, because we must not forget that Europe is an idea and a project rather than a reality or a geographical fact, and its historic dimension is therefore fundamental. In the third place, so that we may be fully aware that European construction is a novel project that shapes a new idea of Europe.

Pressing issues such as the boundaries of the European continent, the unity of European civilization in juxtaposition with its great ethnic, political, linguistic and cultural diversity, or transatlantic relations, would therefore gain in being discussed in the light of history.

I will divide this talk into two parts. In the first, I will present an extremely brief look at the history of Europe, as if Ulysses, the first modern European, had sailed towards the present on the ocean of our collective memory, instead of going to Ithaca; it will be a brief historical evocation in compliance with the Delphic motto that Socrates helped to disseminate: “Know thyself”, in the hope that we may validate Freud’s theory, which attributed undeniable therapeutic virtues to the practice of this precept... In the second part, I will touch on the difficulties and the political issues per se raised by the future constitutional organisation of Europe, as well as the unavoidable challenges facing us.

1. From past to present

Although it grew around the Mediterranean, the Greco-Roman universe founded Europe. To the Greeks and the Romans we owe the invention of politics and of history as political history. The very idea of universal empire cuts across the entire history of Europe, marked always by a succession of imperial ambitions involving to a certain extent Universalist purposes. Aristotle, tutor to Alexander the Great, attributed the Hellenic people’s capacity to rule the world to their political organisation. In the end, the Roman Empire was an expression of Alexander’s dream, he who had ambitions to merge his peoples into a universal empire.

Athens, symbol of Greek civilization, considered that the political issue was essentially a philosophical one. Reflecting on the ideal city, Plato founded it on the idea of justice. Aristotle took as his starting point the ideas of law, freedom and equality of citizens to find the best form of government. Greek democracy, we should bear in mind, is rooted in logos, in the political reason and in the debate that the people’s representatives had with their voters in the public square, the agora.

In opposition to this civilization based on the free use of the word, the core of Roman civilization lies in the rule of law or jus. The political issue is an issue of law. It is the law that regulates the exercise of political power, including that of the Emperor himself, and it is expressed in institutions. It was because this simple but precise system was abstract that it was applied to all the provinces of the empire. Having preserved its unity and diversity, Rome is still the paradigm of the myth of the universal empire.

During the Middle Ages the opposition then prevailing between North (Barbarian) and South (Greco-Latin) was attenuated, the Mediterranean lost its centrality and the rift between East and West grew and was further accentuated by the fall of Constantinople in 1453 and its integration in the Ottoman Empire. It was then that Europe started to be identified with the West, regardless of any geographical reason and to the detriment of a closer reading of history. Many of the ambiguities in the Europe of today stem from this.

The birth of Europe as such has been laid at the door of Charlemagne, when he set up the capital of his empire in Aix-la-Chapelle, a long way from the Mediterranean. The image of empire, renovated by the ideal of Christian universality and the assimilation of Roman law, continued to mark medieval political thinking, which was never able to solve the crucial issue, at the time, of whether supreme authority should be vested on the Pope or the Emperor.

Feudal Europe gradually led to the constitution of a Europe of sovereign and rival states. After the Renaissance, transformations occurred at a faster pace. The project of the universal empire lost heart, Christian unity was broken and we see the emergence of a Europe of Christianities: in the East, Greek Orthodox; in the West, Catholics, later divided into Protestants in the North and Catholics in the South.

The Reformation played its part in the birth of nations, considered as being an exercise in sovereignty endowed with a national religion and language. Sovereignties were to divide Europe politically. With the passing of time the notion of sovereignty passed from the monarch to the nation, and with the French Revolution the nation grasped political power, just as a century earlier in England, the State had been "nationalised".

Modern European history is marked by the political affirmation of the nation-States, sovereign, zealous of their authority and independence and seeking to maintain a certain balance in their mutual relations. In 1648, the Treaty of Westphalia expressly mentioned the need to ensure "a just balance between the powers".

Nevertheless, European history is riddled with hegemonic ambitions, rivalries, alliances and adverse coalitions, in which big states confront big states, the small states acting as a counterweight, forming alliances hither and thither according to the interests at stake.

The principle of nationalities, as an expression of the political goal of making State and Nation coincide, was progressively asserted during the 19th century. The independence of Greece in 1830 is a good example of this. Its modern version is expressed in the people’s right to self-determination, that is the right to set up an independent State. The most recent example of this right is the case of East Timor, which as you know mobilised tremendous efforts on the part of the international community and to which Portugal was so highly committed, with constant support from Greece.

The Second World War and decolonisation brought an end to Europe’s apogee, definitely putting paid to any pretensions Europe might have had regarding the world. New dynamics developed at world level, new forces and actors appeared that acquired a hitherto unknown visibility and undermined the exercise of sovereignty by the States: the emergence of public opinions, the growing internationalisation of the economies and the structuring of International Society. Nothing would ever be as before. Europe ceased being the centre of the universe and became just another continent.

In the aftermath of war, combating the spectre of the idea of its decline, Europe embarked on a search for unity. The process of European construction had begun. It must be stressed that this was a novel project, meant to reconcile peoples and avoid war, all the more daring because Europe was split down the middle into two antagonistic blocs and the peace then possible rested in the bipolar balance of the Cold War that haunted the European continent over almost half a century.

Nineteen eighty-nine will therefore live on in history as Europe’s big opportunity, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the start of the reencounter of Central and Eastern Europe with democracy. Despite the ever-present uncertainties, Europe is now preparing to shoulder the historic task of reuniting the European continent. In addition to this objective it is also consolidating its foundations and furthering the integration process. In other words, we are re-founding Europe as a markedly political project. It is a challenge that is twofold and immeasurable. But we have many reasons to hope.

2. From the present to the future

In the debate on the future of Europe there are several fundamental issues which in my view would benefit from being more clearly elucidated. These are: the issue of the boundaries of the European Union, the issue of transatlantic relations; the issue of the aims of the European Union, and the issue of the political nature of the European Union. I will consider them one at a time.

a) The Boundaries of the European Union

If, as we have just seen, geography alone cannot determine Europe’s boundaries, from which history and politics are inseparable, it is also obvious that we cannot keep pushing them indefinitely in space.

When considering the boundaries of Europe, the eastern ones are the most controversial. In the first place, because two large countries – Russia and Turkey – lie between Europe and Asia and, though basically on the Asian continent, their territories are closely linked to Europe by a common history going back centuries. In the second place, their vastness and specificities have been the source of endless controversies, regardless of their great strategic value.

As I see it, it is the historical, political and strategic reasons that must prevail when considering whether or not to include or exclude a particular State, such as Turkey or Russia, that geography has placed at the very end of the European continent. This is what General de Gaulle meant when he said that Europe stretched from the Atlantic to the Urals.

At this moment, however, it is the issue of Turkey that is causing the greatest controversy in view of the renewed commitment that the authorities in Ankara have shown concerning their accession to the European Union, considered a priority of Turkish foreign policy and a decisive motivation in their domestic policy.

It is true that Europe is currently dealing with the immeasurable challenge of the enlargement and is totally absorbed in its preparation, as well as with the process of internal constitutional reform, a need which stems partly from the enlargement itself. The Union is, therefore, at a turning point in its history. Great changes are in the offing, bringing also fears and some hesitancies. I believe that some of the less favourable reactions to the prospect of Turkey’s accession are due to this extremely demanding environment in which we are currently living.

However, we must not forget that some of these fears are linked to the erroneous idea that the Jewish-Christian matrix of the European civilization irrevocably excludes from the European project a mainly Islamic nation such as Turkey. This, in my view, is a serious prejudice. Though not wishing to deny the importance of Christianity as a factor of unity of Western European civilization, the Greco-Latin legacy, root of all Western political thought, with its concepts of freedom, law, justice and democracy, seems to me equally or even more determinant. Furthermore, we cannot ignore that relations with the "Empire of the Levant" are an important component in European history and politics. Besides, Caesar and God always claimed to have come from different cities.

Consequently, the critical issue in Turkey’s integration in the European project should not be the fact that the majority of its population is Muslim; the issue is rather to ascertain whether the Turkish State is a de jure and de facto secular State, with respect for the rule of law, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms. This can be verified by the political criteria of Copenhagen. It is according to these criteria, together with the other parameters, that we must decide whether or not a European State has the capacity to join the European Union. In this particular case, further demands should not be made. Nor can we make allowances, lest we should compromise the entire European Union.

On the other hand, I am profoundly convinced that this process will have little chance of success without a strong, broadly based consensus surrounding the accession project. The European Union representing a community of values and destiny, there must be “the common will to live together, to act out the common, indivisible inheritance they share”, to paraphrase Renan. This, in my view, is a condition that must be fulfilled before the Copenhagen criteria. However, it eminently concerns each candidate country’s internal affairs, which explains, for instance, why Norway and Switzerland never joined the Union.

At the same time, a decision to establish a date for the start of accession negotiations for a new candidate must also weigh the Union’s own capacity to shoulder, at some stage, the resulting responsibilities in this context. However, this is a question of practical assessment of opportunity or practical feasibility, not a question of principle.

As I see it, the integration of Turkey into the European Union is a promising wager, one that is of mutual interest: on one hand, it will enable a reinforcement of the national consensus on the secular character of the Turkish State; on the other hand, it will certainly contribute, in the troubled world in which we live since September 11th, to a better perception of Europe by Muslim countries, thus invalidating the false, dangerous idea of the much talked about "clash of civilizations".

Turkey is at the junction of two worlds. It is already a member of the Council of Europe, of the OECD and of NATO, and its integration in the European Union will definitely anchor it in Europe, thus helping to consolidate the space of freedom, democracy, justice and security we, as mankind, long for. These are the values which all people claim as their own, regardless of creed.

Within this framework I must also mention the Cyprus issue. Following decades of deadlock and tensions between Greece and Turkey, we now seem to be closer to a solution, as long as all parties involved show the same spirit of engagement and mutual compromise. It is an encouraging example that shows how the integration of peoples and States is a sure wager in unity, peace and stability. I sincerely wish that during the Greek Presidency of the Union, the reunification of the island can be concluded, together with its integration in the European Union.

The issue now at stake regarding Turkey will probably be raised again in the near future regarding Russia and perhaps some countries of the Mediterranean front as well. It is however also true that just as the concept of «Association Agreement» was born by chance, within the framework of Greece’s accession to the then EEC, it will be possible, if need be, to work out a new level of privileged partnership with these countries that makes it possible to create a space of closeness and increased synergies where nobody might feel unjustly excluded.

b) Transatlantic Relations

This issue involves the ambiguous ideas of "Europe" and the "West", which are more determined by history than conditioned by geography.

During the Cold War, the idea of the West, which included the United States and Canada, rested on NATO’s defence system. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the break-up of the socialist bloc determined the disappearance of the Soviet threat, which cemented the union of the «West» and brought about a lack of definition concerning the aims of the Atlantic partnership. Thus the Western democracies’ military and political dependence on the United States largely lost its ‘raison d’être’.

Henceforth Europe committed itself to developing strategic autonomy, an intent that to a certain extent had already been present in the previous creation of the Western European Union. The Maastricht Treaty would definitely confirm this ambition, which is associated to the goal of pursuing the political integration of Europe, firmly reiterated in Maastricht.

The uncertainties that have marked the development of a Common Security and Defence Policy and the difficulties of defining a Defence Policy for the European Union are largely due to the preponderance of the affirmation of national sovereignties in this regard and their games of alliances and elective affinities. They are also linked, however, with some ambiguity in transatlantic relations.

For the European Union to be a credible world power it must have military operational capacity, autonomous capacity, adequate weaponry and equipment and an intelligence service of its own, in the framework of a political autonomy in relation to the United States. Personally, I cannot conceive a European defence policy that is not articulated with the NATO framework. After all, most of the European Union countries are also members of NATO and all of them support the values and principles on which our civilization rests. The enlargement of NATO, recently decided at the Prague Summit, is in my view a decisive step towards the reinforcement of the Alliance’s European pillar, thus adding to the consolidation of the European Security and Defence Policy.

However, defending the West is not the same as building Europe. Therefore, Europe’s foreign security and defence policy is by no means confined within the framework of NATO. I believe that with the prospect of the implementation of Europe’s political unity in the long run and its assertion as world power, it unavoidably needs to have its own voice, a strong presence; it has to undertake autonomous action on the world stage, complementing or in opposition to or in competition with that of other powers, according to the vicissitudes of history and the variable correlations of the forces at stake.

c) The Aims of the European Union

European construction is based, philosophically, on freedom and citizenship; in terms of political institutions, on democracy; and economically, on a market economy.

Monnet’s method, which consisted of progressively establishing the successive phases of European construction without raising the issue of the ultimate goals of this process, bore fruit. However, having accumulated fifty years of success, having achieved the Single Market, Economic and Monetary Union, introduced European citizenship, registered considerable progress in terms of justice and internal affairs, and following the initiatives taken within the scope of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as well as the tentative definitions of a European Defence Policy, even if we consider them to be insufficient, the European Union can no longer refrain from more clearly examining the shape and the aim of the project it wishes to pursue.

In view of the impending reunification of the European continent, which means the European Union will change in scale in the face of an international context characterised by globalisation, loaded with added opportunities but also new threats, in view of a world marked by instability and the outbreak of all sorts of crises, deepening the European project is not to be refused.

It was in the conviction that it was not a question of merely revising the Treaties and introducing some reforms within the Union that the heads of State and of Government of the Fifteen themselves decided to call a Convention, rather than an ordinary Intergovernmental Conference. The meaning and scope of this decision should not be underestimated.

The unusual calling of this Convention, which has acted rather like a constituent assembly, appears precisely to obey the idea that the Union should rethink its role, and redefine its aims and purposes. Fundamentally, what is at stake is the clarification of the political purposes of the European Union which have always been implied but never explained.

The non-existence of political Europe at the turn of this century certainly gives rise to considerable reflections, making Europeans think about what they want for Europe, what they expect from it, and what they are prepared to risk and invest to achieve these objectives. I have no doubt that we have the historic task of redefining a new concept of the exercise of States’ national sovereignty that, without abolishing it, will nevertheless entail new models of political decision-making and increased sharing of competences, particularly in the field of diplomatic and, in the long run, military affairs.

It remains to be seen whether we can overcome the divergences that have marked the half century of the history of European integration during which there have been two visions of Europe: on the one hand, the idea of Europe as a free-trade zone, with a few common policies and a single currency, but limited political ambitions and, on the other, an idea of Europe with political unity, having adequate resources to pursue its goals and with the ambition of becoming a world power.

Personally, to overcome the challenges of the 21st century, I believe we must concentrate on the second alternative or risk becoming prisoners of a static notion of a sovereign Nation-State that no longer has any meaning in history. We will definitely find our way forward to the future through the political integration of Europe and its construction as a political unity.

d) The Political Nature of the European Union

We are going through a period of fundamental change. In order to re-found the European Union we must clarify what type of political union we want for Europe. In other words, we can no longer avoid the issue of the political nature of the “Federation of Nation-States” we wish to build.

The pivotal point of the forthcoming constitutional Treaty will no doubt lie in the type of political model then presented, not only in terms of the configuration of relations between the member-States and the Union, but also in terms of the Union’s exercise of power.

It is impossible to ignore that from the point of view of an enlarged Europe, the enormous number of countries, the added diversity of sensitive issues, cultures and languages present will, as in the time of the Roman Empire, be a factor of dissolution or at the very least dilution of the European project. The extreme diversity resulting from the enlargement and the enormous disparities in the development of the different States will unavoidably require a reinforcement of solidarity and of the elements that ensure cohesion.

In my view, the idea of actually completing a Constitutional Pact is already a good start, because it will enable to deepen the trust between peoples and States. But it will obviously not be enough. The proposed model of the Union and the form of European governance suggested will be vital for the success or failure of Europe.

Allow me now to invoke Thucydides. His analysis of the causes of the Peloponnesian war mentions Athens’s hegemonic pretensions and the break in the balance of power, which, till then, prevailed between the cities.

I use this example merely to highlight the fact that the principle of equality of States seems to me to be absolutely essential in European construction. Legal equality is not enough, however. It is vital to ensure that the Union’s institutional architecture and functional model have proper conditions to achieve a balance of power between States, for otherwise Europe could well renounce its very federative aims.

Indeed, it would be Utopian to think that, within the framework of the future federation, there will no longer be relationships of power between Nation-States, that their size, their specific weight and their own power will no longer count. Within the Union, power games will continue to exist, as will hegemonic attempts, affronts and alliances between the Member States. But the novelty lies precisely in the fact that this variable geometry of coalitions is now inscribed in a regulatory framework subject to clearly defined rules. By way of example, it’s worth recalling the significant case of the reformulation, in Nice, of the criterion involved in the calculation of the qualified majorities, which now include a demographic component, as you know.

In my view, it is essential that in the future institutional architecture, consideration be given to mechanisms to prevent the a priori configuration of hegemonic situations and of constitution of directoires, just as it is indispensable that those elements that enhance equality between States be preserved.

I would like to say a few words about the rotating presidency of the Council: on the one hand, one should not confuse discussion of the rotation principle with the figure of president of the Union, for these are two distinct issues that must remain separate; on the other, the idea that the rotating presidency cannot continue is merely hypothetical, one that has yet to be demonstrated, though I personally acknowledge the difficulties that will face the regime in an enlarged Europe. That said, I believe that the symbolic aspect of the exercise of rotating presidency is politically important in a Union that, in the eyes of the citizens, seems so abstract and so devoid of emotional meaning. Furthermore, it is also a fine occasion for the expression of the European commitment of a member State, for the increase of its credibility and leadership within Europe, one that will also mobilise the entire civil society and public opinion at home.

I believe it would be a mistake to put an end to rotating presidency. My understanding, on the contrary, is that presidential rotation should be maintained, though it could be adapted and improved. There are various ways of doing so, that will take into account the large number of States that will come to be members of the European union, and will also improve its performance.

With regard to the issue of the possible institution of the figure of a president of the Union, it seems to me to be an idea contrary to the principle of economy that ought to govern the proper working of any system. In my view, it is neither a multiplicity of positions nor a separation of figures and duties that will bring about any improvement of the effectiveness of the Union, render it more coherent or strengthen its image. The future Federation of Nation States will never be a federation similar to that of the United States, and the figure of president of the Union seems to me to be neither necessary nor even desirable.

The question of the desirable credibility and of the external representation of the Union could well be solved in other ways. As we know, in addition to the rotating presidency of the European Council, the European Union already has the permanent figures of president of the Commission and secretary-general of the Council, who is also the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. In my opinion, it would be preferable that the attribution of their competences be reviewed, the duties of both articulated, and the role of the president of the European Commission strengthened and provided with increased democratic legitimacy. These would surely be steps in the right direction, steps that would not affect the essential principles and balances that all the States require in the institutional architecture of the Union.

In order to consolidate the political unity of the Union we need to develop its supra-state component. This means not only strengthening the Commission, which would increase its credibility and political power, but also more widespread use of decision by qualified majority. Since it is neither possible to abolish as of now the Union’s three-pillar structure nor to apply to all the issues the community method, the open co-ordination method could at least be applied to the area of the present political co-operation. From this standpoint, the Commission and the European Council would develop new working relations, in close co-operation with the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and with the active involvement of the military structures that have already been created within the Union.

Future investment in the areas of foreign policy, security and defence of the Union should constitute the main transformation of post-enlargement Europe. This, in my view, is correlative to the political reformulation of the Union. But it also reflects the ambition designed to provide Europe with the status of a world power that it is legitimately entitled to claim.

However, it seems to me quite likely that the option for investment in the foreign dimension of the Union would inevitably lead to another change, which would be negative for countries such as Greece and Portugal: diminishing the weight of the cohesion policies, in a scenario of unchanged availability of resources. If we are not to witness a re-nationalisation of these policies the available resources will have to be increased. But, for this, European public opinion must be shown that the matter is one of legitimate decision on the grounds of a fair redistribution policy, directed at the independence of Europe in name of the affirmation of a European identity shared by every European.

We must not therefore neglect the Europe of the citizens, the alpha and omega of European construction. Without their approval and their active involvement Europe will be but an empty house in a deserted continent. We must therefore keep the flame of Europe alight in the hearts of the citizens, making them solidary in this common destiny.

Dear friends,

Just as Ulysses’s return to Ithaca can be interpreted as a feat of the European in search of himself, so too has our adventure of European construction been undertaken as a discovery of European unity, despite the ethnic, linguistic, political and cultural mosaic of which it is made.

The path that we have taken has been, like that of Ulysses, in the words of Cavafy, "long, full of adventures and filled with discoveries". May we Europeans, too, like Ulysses, "keep Ithaca ever in out minds", allowing "legend to permeate reality", in the suggestive words of Fernando Pessoa.